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Abstract
The family is a universal and enduring institution that forms the basis of many economic decisions.
Is decision making within the family e¢ cient? The empirical literature on this issue is inconclusive
to date, hence this paper uses a quasi-eld experiment to examine this question. The experimental
analysis involved real-time observationsof individual investment decisions made by three hundred
families in rural South India. Participantscontrol over family income was varied through how
they shared earnings from their investment decisions with their spouse, and also through the
form of payment. Information was varied through what spouses were told about participants
investments options and actual choices, once the decisions were made. We found direct evidence
of ine¢ ciency in investment decisions. Both for men and women, investment e¢ ciency was very
sensitive to the control they wielded control over family income generated. However, the nature
of information their spouse received ex-post had little impact. Strikingly, even when there was
no tradeo¤ between maximizing household and private income, about a third of the men in the
sample undercut their private income so as to narrow the income gap with their wives. In all
other decisions too, these men were less inclined to maximize household income, and so were their
wives. While women did care about control over family income, it was the absolute income, rather
than income relative to their husbands that seemed to matter. The ndings suggest that family
decisions are a mixture of cooperation and conict (Sen(1990)), and have important implications
for the design of targeted income transfer programs.
Keywords: Intra-household Models, Familiy, Efficiency, Bargaining, Field Ex-
periment
JEL Classification:
1 Introduction
The family is the most universal and enduring social institution that exists. It is the basic building
block in the edice of institutions that govern social and economic interactions, ranging from
marriage and child-rearing to consumption, time allocation to work and human capital investment.
Yet, directly observing the inner workings of the institution of the family has not been easy.
Despite several decades of study one of the most basic questions remain unresolved: Is decision
making within the household e¢ cient? Or are household members willing to destroy collective
resources for some private gain? Becker (1981) has argued that e¢ ciency in household decision
making has to be the natural presumption. This is not only because of altruism among family
members. It is also because they are involved in repeated and long-term interactions with each
other, have good information about each otherspreferences and choices and face low transactions
costs. However, dramatic inequalities within households in the allotment of food and medical care
and consequently in health status (noted by Sen(1990) and others) as well as phenomena such as
domestic violence and child abuse do cast doubt on this presumption of e¢ ciency. Despite
this, empirically demonstrating ine¢ ciency in household decision making has proven to be quite
di¢ cult.1 This paper hence takes a di¤erent route to addressing the question of e¢ ciency in family
decisions, an experimental one. Using real-time observation of individual investment decisions
made by three hundred families in rural South India, it provides some of the rst direct evidence
of (in)e¢ ciency in family decisions.
Theoretical models of the household di¤er in their assumptions about what households maxi-
mize: a common set of preferences (the unitary approach) or a weighted sum of individual prefer-
ences(the collective approach).2 This di¤erence notwithstanding, most models have one common
1See Duo and Udry (2004) for a recent discussion on this issue.
2The unitary approach, pioneered by Samuelson(1956) and Becker(1974) imply e¢ ciency since all members max-
imize the same set of preferences, either by assumption or through inducement provided by an altruistic household
head. There are a few strands in the collective household approach, where weights for the family memberspreferences
depend upon individual bargaining power . The cooperative bargaining framework introduced by McElroy and Hor-
ney(1981) and Manser and Browning(1980) assume e¢ ciency, as does the more generalized framework adopted by
Chiappori and others(1988, 1992).
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feature: they either imply or assume e¢ ciency in the household decision-making process. For
sure, there are good reasons to expect e¢ ciency , but also some realities that suggest otherwise(as
outlined earlier). Accordingly, there are some notable exceptions to this approach of assum-
ing e¢ ciency in household decision making: Lundberg and Pollak(1993,2003), and more recently
Basu(2006).3 The rich theoretical literature in this area has spawned a large body of research
that seeks to empirically characterize household decision-making. While the unitary approach has
been all but jettisoned as a result of this work, ndings on the e¢ ciency issue have been much less
conclusive.
For instance, Chiappori and Browning(1994) derive testable implications of assuming e¢ ciency
in the allocation of households consumption resources on its demand patterns. Testing these
implications with Canadian household data, they are unable to rule out e¢ ciency; Thomas and
Chen(1995) arrive at a similar conclusion for households in a di¤erent setting, Taiwan. However,
work by Duo-Udry(2004) on intra-household insurance against weather shocks suggests a di¤erent
picture, as does work by Fafchamps and Qusimibing(1998) on the allocation of household chores
in Pakistan. Persuasive evidence of production ine¢ ciency has come from Udry(1996)s work on
household production decisions in Burkina Faso4 while recent work by Akresh(2005) suggests
that production decisions in all other areas of Burkina Faso are in fact e¢ cient. All in all, it seems
reasonable to conclude, with the available empirical ndings based on survey data, that the jury
is still out on the issue of intra-household e¢ ciency.
In this paper, we therefore choose to take a di¤erent and more direct approach to addressing
the issue, an experimental one.5 There a several advantages to such an approach. For one,
3Lundberg and Pollak(1993) present a model where e¢ cient outcomes are one of several possible equilibria.
Lundberg and Pollak(2003) and Basu(2006) presents frameworks where spouses decisions are ine¢ cient in the
short run because they a¤ect not only their current outcomes, but also their future bargaining power.
4Udry(1996) nds that plots owned by women receive lower than the optimal inputs (labor and fertilizer), relative
to mens plots, to the tune of about 30%.
5There is a recent crop of papers that uses experimental methods to address household issues. Peters et al(2004)
studies intra-family altruism in a public goods experiment with family members and strangers, Ashraf(2006) looks at
the e¤ect of communication between spouses on consumption/savings decisions and Robinson(2006) studies e¢ ciency
of intra-household insurance of membersconsumption shocks.
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household decisions are observed on a real time basis. Hence there is no need to infer it ex-
post from reported data on household allocation decisions about consumption or production.
Second, survey data on sensitive questions such as intra-household bargaining tend to often elicit
responses that are perceived as being correctin the cultural and social milieu in which respondents
live. These responses may not correlate well with peoples actual behavior.6 An additional point
worth highlighting is the reason for focus here on investment, rather than consumption decisions.
With consumption decisions, participants can make changes in allocation of regular household
expenditures (outside the experiment) in ways that compensate for the decisions made during the
experiment. Since the latter are not observed by the experimenter, decisions made during the
experiment may not reect participantsactual choices. This was not a problem with investment
decision treatments designed, since the scope for substitution outside the experimental setting did
not exist. Participants simply had an opportunity to earn additional income for their household,
over and above that from their usual sources.
No doubt, one common concern with studying decisions experimentally is that participants
may nd the setting articial and this may inuence their behavior. Various aspects of the
experiment were designed with as much regard to this issue as possible. It was conducted as a quasi-
eld experiment in the Anantpur district of Andhra Pradesh, India with a sample of about 300
households. The female participants recruited were members of self-help-groups (SHGs) started
by the Social Education and Development Society(SEDS), a non-governmental organization that
has operated in the area for twenty-ve years.7 Accordingly, the experiment was conducted on
the premises of SEDS, a setting that all participants were familiar with. The sample consisted of
women from 38 SHGs scattered over 32 villages and their spouses. Particular care was taken to
select and schedule participating villages such that there was no contamination of the experiment
through information leakage. In keeping with the local area customs, experiment coordinators
6 Indeed, there was such a gap between participantsanswers to preliminary survey questions and their actual
decisions in the present experiment.
7Self-help groups are voluntary organizations that promote group savings and o¤er mutual nancial support to
members. These have been activley promoted by the state government of Andhra Pradesh. Most such groups have
only women as members, and no men.
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were matched with the sex of the participants as well. In order to maintain the privacy of the
participants, the tasks of explaining the experiment instructions to them versus recording their
decisions were assigned to di¤erent coordinators. Households could earn close to a weeks wages
 not an insubstantial amount of money, thus making the decisions more real. All investment
decisions were made with actual money and payments were made in cash or post o¢ ce savings
accounts8.
Individual participants were given an initial sum of money (a little over a days wage), which
they allocated across two investment options made  red and blue the rst with a lower
(linear) rate of return than the other.9 Participants made decisions individually, but returns from
investment were to be shared with their spouse. They were each presented with four separate
investment decisions. The test of e¢ ciency came from a simple trade-o¤ between an investors
earnings for the family and his/her control over those earnings, relative to the spouse. In three of
the investment decisions, earnings from the low return option (red) were always paid to the investor
in a private account, but those from the high return option were paid to the spouse. The degree of
control the investor had over the spouses earnings was varied through the form of payment to the
latter: under low(investor) control, the spouse was paid in a private account; under moderate
control, he/she was paid in cash - which made it easier for the investor to gain access to those
earnings and nally under highcontrol, the spouse was paid in a joint account with the investor.
The fourth investment decision involved no trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency of the investment decision
and control over income: earnings from both investment options were simply assigned to spouses
according to a xed share, predetermined by the experimenter. All four decisions were within
subject treatments, hence they had the advantage that unobserved heterogeneity in participants
characteristics were in no way a source of concern.
In addition to control, a secondary goal of the experiment was to examine whether e¢ ciency of
individual decisions may be sensitive to what his/her spouse would be told about their investment
options and decisions after they had made them. Spouses were randomly assigned to one of
8Post o¢ ce savings accounts were chosen over bank accounts based on proximity and familiarity to participants:
every village has a post o¢ ce and is frequented by local residents, whereas only larger villages have banks.
9There was no uncertainty in investment returns.
4
three treatment groups for this. They received either full information about their partners
investment options, actual choices and contribution to their own earnings, no information or
partial informationonly about how much their partner earned for them, but nothing about their
options or actual choices. Also, to ensure that e¢ ciency was not a¤ected by investorsinability to
discuss their decisions with their spouses, participants in the partial information treatment were
given the option to discuss their decisions with their (non-investing) spouse and revise them.
We found clear evidence of ine¢ ciency in decision making by household members of both
sexes. Underinvestment in the high return blueoption ranged from as low as 1.5% to as high as
35% across di¤erent decisions. The driving source of this ine¢ ciency was the desire for greater
control over family earnings. Across decisions, women did invest more e¢ ciently (i.e. more in the
high return option) than men, but they were equally, and sometimes more responsive than men, to
variations in the degree of control over family income.10 Interestingly, ine¢ ciency was not sensitive
to what spouses learnt about the investment options and decisions after the fact and this was
as true for women as for men. Such an absence of gender di¤erence in the e¤ects of information
was surprising, given the social context in which the experiment was conducted: domestic violence
and alcohol related abuse of women is not uncommon here, and the social stigma attached to
being a widow is still considerable.11 One possible explanation is that spouses dont have much
ability to hide information from their spouses, outside the experimental domain. Alternatively,
women may discount their husbands ability to punish them once their decisions are made just
as their husbands do. After all, 90% of the women in the sample work outside the home and earn
their independent income, which may make the husbands power status as household head more
nominal than real.12
10This ine¢ ciency was not driven by the inability to negotiate decisions with ones spouse or discuss side-payments.
Please refer to section 3.1.1 for details.
11Divorce is uncommon, given the social stigma and scope for harassment associated with being a single woman.
12Recent experimental work by Ashraf(2006) has found that in the Phillippines, family members consump-
tion/savings decisions are sensitive to the communication they share with their spouse. There are two potential
sources of di¤erences in the ndings: rst, there are important gender di¤erences in the household decision-making
roles in the two regions studied; second, her experimental treatments varied not just what but also when spouses
received information, relative to the timing of decisions.
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A related and very intriguing outcome was the decisions made when spouses receive xed
shares of investment returns from both options. Here, higher returns to the household yielded
higher returns to the individual. Hence a person interested in maximizing personal income had
no incentive to invest in the low return option. In this treatment, women invested to maximize
absolute income (own and spouses) but about a third of the men invested much less in the high-
return option when they received a smaller share. In other words, men were willing to undercut
their own private income to narrow the income gap with their wives!13 This is especially true
in households with more children, and with a larger fraction of female children. It is clear that
these husbands su¤er some loss of utility when their wifes income is greater than (or even roughly
equal to) theirs. Lundberg and Pollak(2003) and Basu(2006) o¤er one rational explanation for
this: Men could be concerned that short run loss in relative income may erode their future
status as head of the householdwith its power and privileges.14 Indeed, we do nd that such
men in our sample were more reluctant to cede control of family income to their wives in all
other decisions as well. Most interestingly, their wives seemed to anticipate this, since they
invested more ine¢ ciently than other women too.15 However, it may seem implausible that one
time earnings in an experiment would change the intra-household bargaining power of spouses in
any signicant way. If so, other behavioral explanations based on mens notions of their wives
rightfulor legitimateshare of family income need to be considered.
Overall, the picture of the family decision-making process that emerges from these treatments
is very much one of cooperation and conict, to use Sen(1990)s phrase. Our ndings here
have implications for the design of income transfer programs, especially given husbandsconcerns
with relative income. There is by now a large body of evidence that documents the favorable
impact of income transfers targeted to women on child welfare. However, the experimental results
here suggest that too much gender-based targeting may be ill-advised since perceptions of gender
13The investment patterns of men and women in other decisions, along with their literacy rates and other observ-
able characteristics, strongly suggest that mens behavior is not driven by confusion or misunderstanding.
14 Women in the sample do not have such a position to lose which would be consistent with their decision to
maximize household (and personal) absolute income.
15Women who maximize household income in the xed share treatment do not evoke such reciprocity from their
husbands.
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imbalance in transfers may trigger responses from men that undermine household welfare.16
Section 2 describes the setting where the experiment was conducted, as well as details of
the experiment design. It explains the rationale for the specics of the various control and
information treatments, as well as the measures taken to ensure internal and external validity.
Section 3 describes the main ndings on the impact of the various treatments. It also highlights
some of the more puzzling outcomes, and alternative possible interpretations of these outcomes.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Setting and Experiment Design
2.1 Setting
The experiment was conducted in the Anantpur district of Andhra Pradesh, India in October
2005. Being the second-most drought prone district in the country, it is among the poorest as
well. The sample consisted of 300 households, recruited with the help of the Social Education
and Development Society(SEDS), a non-governmental organization (NGO) that has operated in
the area for twenty-ve years. All the female participants recruited were members of self-help-
groups (SHGs) started and promoted by SEDS17. The set of 85 villages where SEDS operates
were stratied by length of SHG membership of its women and groups were chosen from the three
strata so created; all married members of 38 SHGs (and their spouses) from 32 of these villages
were recruited for participation. Particular care was taken to select and schedule participating
villages such that there was no contamination of the experiment through information leakage.
The recruitment process started with a brief initial pre-survey, where women were individually
interviewed and invited to participate in the study, along with their spouses. Prospective partic-
ipants were informed that they would each receive (i) a show-up fee of Rs.50 for participating in
16Quisumbing and Maluccio(2000) provide evidence about the favorable e¤ects of such targeted transfers to
children. They also cite evidence on adverse reactions of men to transfers targeting women, from household level
survey analyses in several developing countries.
17Self-help groups are a type of voluntary group savings and mutual support organization, promoted actively by
the state government of Andhra Pradesh. Typically, SHGs have only women as members.
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a study on the understanding of nancial mattersin the area, and (ii) free transportation to and
from the experiment site. Rs. 50 (roughly equivalent to $1) is comparable to mens daily wages
and somewhat higher than womens daily wages in the area. At the time of recruitment, those
who agreed to participate were informed of the fteen day window in which the study was to be
conducted. The specic dates and times of the experiment for di¤erent participant-groups were
announced later, with at least a two-day advance notice. Members from each SHG were randomly
assigned across all the treatment groups, based on information gathered in the pre-survey. The
experiments were conducted on the premises of the NGO over ten days in late October 2005, with
3-4 village groups participating each day.18
Insert Table 1 here: ParticipantsSummary Statistics
2.2 Experiment Protocol
Participants from each group were brought to the experiment location as per an announced sched-
ule. Upon arrival, they were directed to separate waiting areas set up for men and women. At a
time, three men and three women (couples) from these waiting areas were each directed to one of
six separate rooms. Here, an experiment coordinator outlined the rules of the experiment and the
tasks involved. Participants were presented with four decisions, one at a time. Their decisions
were recorded by two independent data entry sta¤ (one each for the men and the women). In
addition, male participants were administered a survey (very similar to the preliminary survey
for women) once they had completed the experiment. Men and women who had completed the
experiment were required to wait in separate designated areas, until they were called to receive
their payment. When all members of the group had been paid, the entire group was transported
back to their village.
18The no-show rate (among those who agreed to participate after the pre-survey) was around 10%, at least partly
due to rainfall late in the planting season, after a four year drought.
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2.3 Experimental Treatments
The primary focus of treatments was on quantifying how, if at all, the e¢ ciency of the income
generation decisions of household members was inuenced by the degree of control they had over
such income. A secondary goal was to examine whether membersdecisions were sensitive to the
information that their spouses would have about their investment options and choices they made.
Participants were given an initial sum of Rs.50(in the form of ten ve rupee coins), to be
allocated as they pleased, across two investment options, Red and Blue.19 Red yielded a return
of 50%, so that each rupee invested in it yielded a gross return of Rs 1.50 and Blue yielded a
100% return (i.e. Rs. 2 for every rupee invested). There was no uncertainty in the returns, and
all returns were determined and paid out at the end of the experiment itself. Given this linear
return structure, it was pretty clear to all participants what they needed to do to maximize their
households income.
Insert Table 2 Within Subject Treatments: Variations in Investor Control over Household
income
Control Treatments: These consisted of four investment decisions for each investor, that
varied in how the income generated was allocated between her and her spouse, and in the form of
payment. (Refer to Table 2). In the baselinecase, the investor and spouse received a xed shares
(s and 1-s respectively) of the households total income from investment in both options Red and
Blue, in separate private accounts, 0.3s0.7. With a xed share, maximizing household income
also maximized the amount the investor had control over, i.e. there was no trade-o¤ here between
higher household income and investor control over it. In the other three decisions, however,
there was such a tradeo¤, because of who the income generated from the investors decisions was
paid to, and how. In each case, all income from the low return (red) option was paid to the
investor in a private account, while all income from the high return (blue) option was paid to
19The use of the experimenters discretion in determining payment was provided as an option to provide privacy
and plausible deniability to participants about the investment choices they had made. Participants were not told
what amount would be paid if the die yielded a value of ve.
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her spouse either in a private account, in cash or in a joint account with the investor.20 It is
easy to see how the investors control over her spouses income would vary here: Income paid to
the spouse in a private account would be hardest to gain access to (lowinvestor control), cash
received by the spouse would be easier to appropriate (being physically available, unlike a private
account mediuminvestor control) while income in a joint account would be the most accessible
(highinvestor control). Using these within-subject treatment variations allowed us to quantify
how much members of a household valued individual control over its income measured by the
household income they were willing to sacrice for it.
Insert Table 3 Across Subject Treatments: Variations in Spouses Information
Information Treatments: Individuals may like to have a strong say in how household income
is spent, but they may nevertheless be concerned about how their partners would perceive, and
react to, their choices. If so, their investment choices would be sensitive to what their spouses
would know about their options and choices. Since this would a¤ect their behavior in the control
treatments above, we created three treatments labeled none, full and partial that varied
the information that investorsspouses would receive. (Refer to table 3). Husbands and wives
were assigned to the same information treatment. In the nonetreatment, spouses receive no
information about the options or actual investment choices made by their investing partners; in
thefull information treatment, the investment options, actual choices and incomes earned by
investors were revealed to the spouse. In the partial information treatment, the spouse was
only informed about what his partner earned for him, but not what her options were or what
choices she made. Further, investors in the partial information treatment were given the option to
discuss their rst round decisions with their spouse and change one/more of these if they wished
to. The rationale for this negotiationoption was to ensure that any ine¢ ciency observed in
20All accounts opened were postal savings accounts and not bank accounts. The post o¢ ce was chosen for
the simple reason that all villages have access to a post o¢ ce (but not banks), hence operating the account for
withdrawal/deposits would be easier for all participants. Paperwork for all amounts to be paid into an account on
a given day were taken to the post o¢ ce on the next day, when the accounts were actually opened.
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the data was not driven by an inability of spouses to communicate and discuss the decisions with
their partner. While both spouses made investment decisions in the rst two treatments, only
one spouse invested in the partial information treatment.21 It is important to point out that
any information given to a spouse was provided only after the investor had made her decisions,
and she was aware of this at the time of decision-making. Table 4 presents means for some key
participant characteristics, across the three information treatments.
Insert Table 4: Means of Participant Characteristics across Information Treatments
2.3.1 Experiment Instructions
Given the high rates of illiteracy in the population, all instructions and explanations during the
experiment were provided orally by trained experiment coordinators.22 When a subject entered
one of the experiment rooms, a coordinator explained to him that he was there to participate in a
study on understanding of nancial matters in the area, and that he would be presented with four
tasks as part of the study. He was also told that his payment (except for his participation fee of
Rs.50) would be based on his decisions in one of these four tasks, to be chosen randomly with the
roll of a die. It was also emphasized that each one of their decisions were equally likely to be
chosen for payment, hence they should take them all seriously.23 Next, the participant was made
aware of what information his spouse would be given at the end of the experiment (depending
upon the information treatment they were assigned to). Then the coordinator explained the
details of the investment options, Redand Blueand gave the participant Rs.50 (in the form of
ten ve rupee coins) for investment. Investmentrequired the participant to allocate this amount
21The rationale for having only one investing spouse here was to ensure that negotiate option did not become a
case of mutual back-scratchingbetween investing spouses.
22Male coordinators were assigned to male participants, and female coordinators for female participants, on a
one-on-one basis. At any given time, there were six coordinators conducting the experiment, apart from support
sta¤ for data entry, payment and other logistics.
23 In the interests of preserving condentiality about the investors decisions, there was also a fth payment option:
If the roll of the die yielded a ve, the experimenter chose the amount to be paid to both spouses. The presence of
this option was clearly communicated to participants but not the actual amount that would be paid (which was
Rs.35 to each spouse in private accounts).
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across options red and blue as he desired. The four investment decisions were then presented, one
decision at a time (in randomized order). At the end of each decision, a red box and a blue box in
which the participant had investedthe money provided were taken to the data entry sta¤, who
recorded these investments. When both spouses had completed their independent decisions, the
earnings of each spouse was computed. Payments were made privately, on an individual basis.
3 Experiment Outcomes
We now turn to a description of how participants in the study responded to the various experi-
mental treatments. It is useful to keep in mind that in all the treatments, household income is
maximized by investing the amount of Rs.50 given entirely in the high return blueoption (since
it yields a net return of 100% rather than 50% from option red).
3.1 Impact of Investor Control: Ourincome is good, but mine is better!
We begin with table 5(A) and (B) which describes the mean amount invested in option Blue in the
xed shareand three control treatments, broken down by gender as well as by the information
treatment groups.
Insert Table 5A-B on Investment Means (all investors) here
The rst row of Table 5A represents the treatment wherein an investor received a xed share
s of total household earnings from both options Red and Blue. Given this feature here, the
absolute amount an individual would control was largest when household income was maximized
 i.e. there was a clear incentive provided to invest the entire Rs.50 in the high return blue
option. Despite this, the actual investment patterns do not conform to this expectation, mostly
for men. On average, their investment in blue for this decision is Rs.7.8 (about 16%) short, with
some variation across the di¤erent information treatments. Interestingly, such underinvestment
is negligible for women only about Rs2.3 on average. We return to this issue in our discussion
below.
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In the other three decisions, the numbers suggest that the greater the degree of investor
control over the spouses earnings, the more was the amount invested in the high return option
and by both men and women. When the spouse was paid in a private account, a¤ording the
investor the least control over the households income, underinvestment averaged around Rs.15
(30%)  with little variation across the di¤erent information groups. Household income was
slightly higher when the spouse was paid in cash (which can be more easily appropriated), with
investments ranging between Rs.36 and Rs.40. When the return from the high-return option was
paid in a joint account controlled by both spouses, the average amount invested in that option
rose up to between Rs.40.5 and Rs.46.4. Indeed, the minimum amount invested here was higher
than the maximum investment in the previous two treatments. Table 5B reports the number of
participants who invested the entire Rs.50 in the high return option, for each of the four decisions..
Not surprisingly, this number is lowest for the low control case and rises with greater investor
control over household earnings.
Maximizing Household Income versus Maximizing Household Welfare: Our experiment design
here is motivated by the literature on the e¢ ciency of household production (income generation)
decisions and the treatments were designed to address this specic question. As a practical matter
however, it could be argued that there could be reasons why underinvestment in the high return
option may not necessarily be ine¢ cient. For instance, the husband may have self-control problems,
say with respect to spending on alcohol which may end with domestic violence (which even he may
regret after the fact). If so, household welfare would be maximized by the wifes investing in the
lower return option that she controls, rather than maximizing household income. While it is hard
to categorically rule out such a scenario, the observed investment patterns o¤er some suggestive
evidence to rule out such a concern. Arguably, self-control problems of the kind described above
are likely to be more acute when the husbands earnings are in cash than when they are in a private
account. However, wives do not lower their investment in the high return option when the spouse
is paid in cash. If anything, both the average investment and the fraction of women investing at
full e¢ ciency is slightly higher when men are paid in cash, rather than in a private account(tables
5A and 5B). This suggests that wives decisions to invest ine¢ ciently are are not driven by such
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concerns about potential welfare-reducing negative e¤ects of their husbandshigher income.
Insert Table 6A-B on Investment Means (Income Maximizers in Fixed Share Treatment) here
The behavior in the xed sharetreatment is intriguing. One immediate concern that comes
to mind is that they did not understand the experiment instructions clearly.24 Since investment
decisions based on confusion would contaminate our results, table 6A-B presents the average
investment numbers (as in table 5A-B), but only for the subset of investors who put the entire
amount of Rs.50 in option bluein the xed shares treatment. In 6A, a pattern of underinvestment
in option blue, similar to that in table 5A exists even in this subset of rational investors. 6B
shows that not all rational investors in the xed share treatment maximize household income
in other decisions where their control over income varied. It therefore seems safe to conclude
that the observed investment pattern reported in table 4 was not driven by misunderstanding or
confusion about the xed sharestreatment among some males.
3.1.1 Who negotiates?
One concern with the results discussed above could be that individualsbehavior was driven by
lack of an ability to communicate and discuss their decisions with their spouses. This would
be especially concerning, if investors wanted to make side-dealswith their spouses, which would
increase their incentive to invest the maximum in the high return option. The negotiation option,
provided to participants in the partial informationtreatment alone, was designed to address this
specic issue.
Insert Table 7 here: Negotiation with Spouse
24On the rst four days of the experiment, the xed shares of spouses were varied between 30- 70%. In light of
this concern about misunderstanding the experiment instructions, the xed shares were uniformly changed to 50%
each for husbands and wives, from day ve onwards  so as to rule out wrong decisions due to confusion. The
investment behavior among men seems to persist on subsequent days, despite this change.
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Investors could discuss all their initial decisions with their (non-investing) spouse and revise
them, if they so desired. This group consisted of 48 men and 50 women, and table 7 reports who
exercised this option and how they invested. Among the 48 men, it turns out that not a single
man chose to discuss his decisions with his spouse but 18 of these men invested the maximum
amount of Rs.50 on their own initiative itself. 19 women chose not to discuss their decisions, but
only 7 among them had underinvested in at least one of the four decisions. Their underinvestment
was in fact, considerably higher than that of the women who discussed their decisions with their
spouse. Among the 31 women who chose to talk to their non-investing spouses, 21 had already
made initial decisions that maximized household income in all treatments (so they were merely
seeking their husbands approval on their decisions, possibly). Only one among the ten women who
had originally invested less than the maximum in option blue revised her decisions subsequently!
Overall, it appears safe to conclude that the ine¢ ciency in spouseschoices were not driven by an
inability to communicate with their partners. 25
3.1.2 Investor Control over Household Income: Regressions
Table 8 reports regression results for the impact of variation in individual control over household
income on the amount invested in the high return option blue, separately for men and women26
The table shows that individual control was an important factor in determining whether members
maximized their households income. Column 1 shows when the spouse was paid in a private
account, husbands lowered their investment, relative to the xed share treatment, by as much as
Rs.7.30 (given a maximum possible investment of Rs.50). When their wives were paid in cash,
the underinvestment, at Rs 6.6, was somewhat lower, and when their wives were paid in a joint
account there was hardly any di¤erence in their investment relative to the xed share treatment.
Insert Table 8 here: Impact of Control over Incomeon Investment E¢ ciency
25Could consider a probit regression to check if those who have invested e¢ ciently to begin with less likely to
negotiate.
26The omitted control treatment is the xed shares case, where there was no tradeo¤ between maximizing house-
hold income and individual control over it.
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With women (column 5), the underinvestment, at Rs. 9.40 across all information treatments,
seems much sharper than among men.27 As their control over the income rises to medium and then
high, their underinvestment decreases, but the size of the treatment coe¢ cient remains negative
and signicant. While womens underinvestment is similar to mens when the spouse is paid in
cash, they are on average, less condent of their ability to negotiate with their spouses over jointly
owned income. This can be inferred from the persistence of a small, but statistically signicant
underinvestment in option blue in the high control treatment for women. The bottom line is that
control over household income is an important factor that inuences investment decisions of both
men and women across all information categories (although the impact in the partial information
treatment for women is not always statistically signicant).
3.2 Impact of Information: I dont care what she(or even he) will know.
The next set of regressions describe how individual investment decisions were inuenced by the
information that was made available to their spouse at the end of the experiment. Table 9
documents these results, rst for all decisions combined and then, each of the individual decisions,
where spouse shares and control over income di¤ered. The bottom line is that variations in
information treatments had little or no e¤ect on individual decisions. This was true not only for
men, but somewhat more surprisingly for this region of India, also for women. A priori, it would
have been reasonable to posit that womens decisions would be more sensitive to the amount of
information provided to their spouses, since the environment they live in is one where there is not
only male dominance, but also domestic violence.
Insert Table 9 here: Impact of Information to Spouse on Investment E¢ ciency
Variations in information treatments may not have had any impact on investment decisions for
a few reasons. For one, couples may nd it hard to actually hide information from their spouses
as a practical matter, no matter what the information treatments in the experiment were. At
27However, it must be recalled that unlike men, women do not invest ine¢ ciently in the baseline Fixed Shares
treatment which is the omitted treatment here.
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another extreme, the fact that the information was provided to spouses after decisions had been
made may make investorsdecisions a fait accompli and investors may have believed that there
was little their spouses could do to punish them ex-post. After all, it is true that in nearly 90%
of households in the sample, both spouses work and hence they are used to having independent
incomes that they control.
A point of signicant interest here is the intriguing investment behavior of men in the xed
shares treatment. We nd that a 10% increase in the share of the earnings going to the investor
increases his investment in the high-return (blue) option by Rs 2.6 (column 6) and this e¤ect is
signicant at the 1% level.28 In other words, men sacrice not only household income, but even
their private income, so as to ensure their wives dont earn too much more than them! Women,
on the other hand, are unwilling to sacrice their personal income to keep this income gap small 
hence their income share had little impact on their investments. We explore this issue and related
behavior in greater detail in the next section.
3.3 Why do men throw away private income?
In an experimental setting, there are multiple explanations that one must consider to understand
what seems, prima facie, to be an irrationaldecision by over a third of the men in the sample.
They are willing to sacrice their own income, so as to lower their wifes income. Women, on the
other hand, seem to care enough about their absolute earnings that there is little ine¢ ciency in
their decisions in the xed shares treatment.
One possible reason is that these men did not understand the intervention very well possibly
due to a low level of literacy. We nd that the men who made this irrationaldecision do not
have signicantly fewer years of education than other men who maximize income in this treatment
(3.08 years versus 3.22 years). The wives of men in this group are also far less educated than their
spouses (1.06 years), and yet on average they invested Rs.46.6 in the high return option while their
husbands invested only Rs. 25.6. It seems safe to say that the underinvestment is not driven by
28Spouses income shares in the xed share treatment ranged between 30-70%, with increments of 10% from the
minimum to the maximum permitted share.
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a lack of literacy.
Perhaps it is the case that women, while not stronger on overall literacy, have greater aptitude
for nancial decision-making. Based on the survey responses, this seems unlikely. As reported
by the women, the head of the household is typically their husband which suggests that nancial
matters is something that men routinely do. For instance, data from our preliminary survey
clearly indicate that decisions on asset purchases are either taken by husbands unilaterally(21%),
or husbands and wives jointly(64%) and only very rarely by women alone(4%). It does not seem
to be the case that women who are members of SHGs are more assertive of nancial rights than
other women either we found no signicant e¤ect of length of membership on the e¢ ciency of
womens decisions. Also, as explained in a footnote at the beginning of this section, concerns of
confusion prompted a change in the treatment design during the course of the experiment: From
the fth day of the experiment,.xed shares of both spouses were set to 50% whereas they had been
varied between 30% and 70% earlier. The underinvestment in the high return option persisted
despite this change.
A third candidate explanation is that men simply get lower utility when they earn less than
(or even roughly equal to ) their wives. This could be because they believe that this accords
with their status as head of the household. If this status is derived in part from how much
they earn, relative to their wives, it may be more important to them to narrow the gap in their
absolute earnings, rather than maximize their own individual income, or overall household income.
Basu(2006) outlines a framework where an individual may make decisions that do not maximize
household returns in the short run, because allowing higher earnings for his wife today could
undermine his bargaining power in the household in future. In the context of our experiment, the
wife may focus on maximizing her absolute, rather than her relative earnings, because she does
not have such a position of power to cede, to begin with. No doubt, the amounts involved in this
experiment seem somewhat small to cause fundamental shifts in intra-household bargaining power.
However, it is plausible that such power rests as much on symbolic factors as on substantive ones.
Especially if a man is insecure about his status as household head, even a small instance where
the wife earns more than her husband could be interpreted as a potential threat to this status,
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and be a reason for his ine¢ cient decision.
Insert Table 10 (A)-(B) here: Impact of RationalHusbands and Wiveson Investment E¢ ciency
If such insecurity is the explanation for a mans decision to undercut his own income in the xed
share case, it is plausible that such insecurity may spill over to the other decisions as well. If so,
a question that comes to mind is: Is ine¢ ciency in the other decisions explained by the insecurity
reected in the xed share decision? Table 10 A-B throws some light on this question. We
dene "rational husband(wife)" as a husband(wife) who invests the entire Rs.50 in the high return
(blue) option in the xed share treatment. Column (1) shows that unlike  insecurehusbands,
rationalhusbands invest Rs.5 (10%) more in the high return option on average. Interestingly,
columns(2)-(4) reveal that even rational husbands do not like to cede income to their wives in
her private account, with low control over it. But they do invest more e¢ ciently when their
control over the income is medium or high. Rational husbands also seem to induce greater
e¢ ciency in their wives decisions: wives of such men invest almost ten rupees more (20%) in the
high-return option when their husbands get paid in a private account! This is also true for the
other two control treatments, although less so when the men are paid in cash. However, rational
wives do not evoke such reciprocity from their husbands. Table 11(A) and (B) shows that the
marginal explanatory power of mens rationality(or insecurity) on their investment behavior is
considerable: the explained variation rises from 4% to 12% overall.
3.4 Implications for Income Transfer Programs
Our nding on mens concerns with relative income have implications for the design of income and
asset transfers programs. There is by now a large body of evidence that documents the favorable
impact of resource transfers targeted to women on child welfare outcomes.29 However, there is
also anecdotal evidence of adverse reactions to welfare initiatives that target women: Schuler et
29Lundberg and Pollak(1997) provide evidenceof this from the United Kingdom while Quisumbing-Maluccio(2000)
cite several instances based on household survey data from developing countries.
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al(1997) report increased incidence of domestic violence against women beneted by micro-credit
programs in Bangladesh, while Dey Abbas(1997) reports takeover of irrigation projects assigned
to women in Gambia by men and Osmani(1997) cites a case where food security projects targeted
to women in Asia resulted in fewer hours of work and more alcohol consumption among men.
Our experimental results suggests that, even keeping child welfare in mind, such gender targeted
transfers should be used with some discretion. If not, perceptions of strong gender imbalance
in resources may trigger adverse responses from men that undermine household income and/or
welfare.30 This implication of our experimental results is consistent with the anecdotal evidence
cited above.
4 Conclusion
Theoretical models of the household provide several reasons to expect e¢ ciency in intra-household
decision-making, apart from altruism amongst its members: repeated interaction among family
members with low transaction costs and good information about each others preferences and
resources, in a stationary environment. At the same time, realities such as highly unequal health
and education outcomes across family members, domestic violence and child abuse y in the face
of such an expectation. This issue of e¢ ciency has been di¢ cult to resolve using an empirical
approach, given that inner workings of a family are hard to observe.
In an attempt to provide direct evidence of (in)e¢ ciency, this paper has taken an experimental
approach, whereby investment decisions of individuals from 300 households were observed real-
time. The resulting outcomes provide clear evidence of ine¢ ciency in family membersdecisions .
The e¢ ciency of both men and womendecisions clearly rise with greater control they (as investors)
had over the income so generated going from as low as 4% to 30%. However, the information
their spouse would receive about their investment options and decisions ex-post has little impact
on their actual choices. This latter nding is surprising with respect to womens investment
decisions, given a social context where they domestic violence is not uncommon. However, given
30 In fact, we nd that, in our sample, it is men from households with a larger number of female children are
signicantly more likely to undercut their own income to narrow the income gap with their wives.
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that almost 90% of the women in the sample work outside the home and independently earn
income, it is possible that mens position as head of the household entails less authority than
otherwise assumed.
A related and striking nding is that even where there is no conict between maximising
private and household income, over a third of the men in the sample are willing to even undercut
their own private income, to narrow the income gap with respect to their wives. On the one
hand, such behavior could be explained in rationalterms if men perceive a lower relative income
as a potential threat to their status as household heads and to their future bargaining power.
In our data, we do nd that these men are less inclined to cede control over family income to
their wives in all other experimental decisions as well. On the other, it could be argued that the
amounts involved in such an experiment are too small to make any substantial dent in the existing
intra-household balance of power. If so, mens decisions to undercut their private income can
possibly be explained by some behavioral rules of thumbthey use to allocate resources, based on
their perceptions of a wifes rightfulor legitimateshare.
The overall picture of intra-household decision making that emerges is denitely a mixture of
cooperation and conictresulting in some loss of e¢ ciency in the use of family resources. Our
experimental results on mens concerns with relative income also suggest that exclusive targeting
of women in income transfer programs could lead to adverse reactions that undermine the intended
welfare outcomes.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Family Characteristics
Years of Marriage 21.31 10.76
No. of children 2.82 1.44
Household Income (Rupees) 15741.87 15184.87
Women who report conflict with spouse
over financial issues (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0345 0.18
Joint Family(% Households) 25.33%
Both spouses work(% Households) 89%
Personal Characteristics
Wife's age 36.10 9.80
Husband's age 43.20 10.99
Wife's Education (years) 1.36 2.77
Husband's Education(years) 3.12 4.12
Number of Participating Households 300
eTABLE 2: ʹCONTROL OVER HOUSEHOLD INCOMEʹ TREATMENTS 
Seed money for Investment (provided by experimenter) = Rs.50; Household chooses X and Y
Household Income 
Allocation Treatments 
Income from Blue              
Investment=X, Return=2X
Income from Red                 
Investment=Y=(50‐X), Return=1.5Y
Recipient Paid in Amount Recipient Paid in Amount
(1) Fixed Share=s, wher Spouse Pvt. a/c s.2X Spouse Own a/c s(1.5)Y
      (0.3≤ s ≤0.7) Self  Own a/c (1‐s)2X Self  Own a/c  (1‐s)1.5Y
Investor Control over
Spouseʹs income
(2) Low Spouse Pvt. a/c 2X Self  Own a/c  1.5Y
(3) Medium Spouse Cash 2X Self  Own a/c  1.5Y
(4) High Both Joint a/c 2X Self  Own a/c  1.5Y
Notes:  The two investment options are ʹBlueʹ and ʹRedʹ ‐‐ the first with a 100% return, and the second with a 50% 
return.  All treatments are within‐subject treatments. In treatment (1) above, both spouses receive a fixed share of 
income from investments in both options.  Hence, the investor does not increase his private income by investing in the 
lower return option Red.  In treatments (2)‐(4), the investor gains private income by investing in option Red, but in 
doing so (s)he lowers household income.  There is no uncertainty in investment returns.  
                                      TABLE 3:  INFORMATION TREATMENTS
None Full Partial ‘Plus’
Information 
given to 
spouse
No information 
about investor’s (a) 
options (b) choices 
or (c) earnings
Full  information 
about investor’s (a) 
options (b) choices 
and (c) earnings
Information about 
investor’s earnings 
for him/her only        
‐‐  PLUS  ‐‐                 
Investor Option to 
Negotiate (and 
Revise) own 
No. of 
participants 202 202 98
Both 
spouses  Yes Yes
No ‐‐ one spouse 
invests.
Notes: Information treatments are across subjects
Table4: Average Participantsʹ Characteristics across Information Treatments
Information Treatment Groups
Participant Characteristics None Full Partial F‐stat
N=101 N=101 N=98
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Years of marriage 21.66 (10.9) 19.76 (10.66) 22.52 (10.66) 1.72
Number of Children 2.71 (1.38) 2.86 (1.55) 2.898 (1.38) 0.46
Family type: (3=nuclear, 1=joint) 2.74 (0.50) 2.66 (0.55) 2.735 (0.50) 0.76
Caste:
Backward 0.58 (0.49) 0.594 (0.49) 0.561 (0.49) 0.11
Scheduled 0.18 (0.38) 0.138 (0.34) 0.132 (0.34) 0.48
Other backward 0.17 (0.37) 0.188 (0.39) 0.214 (0.41) 0.34
Scheduled tribe 0.06 (0.23) 0.049 (0.21) 0.071 (0.25) 0.21
Wife age 36.66 (9.88) 34.36 (9.87) 37.285 (9.47) 2.49
Husband age 43.55 (11.05) 41.31 (11.22) 44.786 (10.48) 2.58
Wife Education (years) 1.29 (2.83) 1.53 (2.88) 1.265 (2.58) 0.28
Husband Education (years) 3.18 (4.19) 3.27 (4.08) 2.918 (4.09) 0.19
Household income ( Rs. 000s) 15.52 (9.84) 16.68 (20.74) 15 (12.69) 0.32
Household debt ( Rs. 000s) 30.43 (24.65) 28.049 (33.78) 30.18 (26.48) 0.18
Domestic Conflict (0=no, 1=yes) 0.04 (0.19) 0.021 (0.14) 0.041 (0.19) 0.4
Both spouses work (0=no;1=yes) 0.88 (0.32) 0.88 (0.32) 0.91 (0.30) 0.07
Notes: The F‐Statistic reported in the last column indicate whether the mean values of each of the listed characteristics differ .
significantly from each other.  At the 10% level, (critical value=2.32) wifeʹs age and husbandʹs age are found to be 
significantly different across the treatment groups.  These variables have been controlled for in the regressions reported in Table 9.
INFORMATION (Treatments Across Participants ) 
ALL None Full Partial ALL None Full Partial
N=250 N=101 N=101 N=48 N=252 N=101 N=101 N=50
CONTROL (Treatments Within Participants)
Baseline ‐ Fixed Share Treatmenta  42.2 42.48 41.35 43.44 47.68 48.25 47.45 46.9
Low Control Treatmentb 34.94 34.65 35.45 34.48 38.31 36.19 38.47 42.3
Medium Control Treatmentc 35.62 36 36.58 32.81 40.97 40 42.13 40.6
High Control Treatmentd 41.36 41.15 41.99 40.52 45.36 46.09 44.11 46.4
Overall Mean Investment ‐ Rs.(4 decisions) 38.53 38.57 38.84 37.81 43.08 42.63 43.04 44.05
Husbands Wives
Number of Participants 250 101 101 48 252 101 101 50
Baseline ‐ Fixed Share Treatmenta 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.91 0.93 0.89 0.90
Low Control Treatmentb 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.72 0.67 0.72 0.82
Medium Control Treatmentc 0.55 0.54 0.60 0.46 0.78 0.76 0.80 0.78
High Control Treatmentd 0.69 0.66 0.75 0.60 0.88 0.90 0.85 0.92
(All Investors)
Notes: a Spouse gets paid a fixed share s of returns from both investment options, 0.3≤ s ≤0.7.  b Spouse gets paid all returns from 
High return (blue) option in a private account, investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own account.  c Spouse 
gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in cash, investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own 
account. d Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in a Joint account with investor, investor receives all returns 
from Low return (red) option in own account.
TABLE 5A: Mean Investment in High return(Blue) Option‐‐ Rupees (Min=Rs.0, Max.=Rs.50)
Husbands Wives
 (ALL Investors)
TABLE 5B: Fraction of Income Maximizing Investors, by ʹControl of Incomeʹ Treatments 
Husbands Wives
N=170 N=69 N=68 N=33 N=229 N=94 N=90 N=45
CONTROL Treatments (Within Participants)
Baseline ‐ Fixed Share Treatmenta 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Low Control Treatmentb 36.89 35.65 36.4 36.37 38.93 35.5 40.28 43.33
Medium Control Treatmentc 37.82 37.32 39.41 35.61 41.35 39.57 43.33 41.1
High Control Treatmentd 43.29 41.09 45.22 43.94 46.02 45.96 45.22 47.78
Overall Mean Investment ‐ Rs.(3 decisions) 42.00 41.02 42.76 41.48 44.08 42.76 44.71 45.55
ALL None Full Part ALL None Full Part
CONTROL Treatments (Within Participants) Husbands
Baseline ‐ Fixed Share Treatmenta 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Low Control Treatmentb 0.64 0.59 0.66 0.70 0.76 0.67 0.80 0.87
Medium Control Treatmentc 0.70 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.82 0.77 0.87 0.82
High Control Treatmentd 0.82 0.75 0.90 0.82 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.96
a Spouse gets paid a fixed share s of returns from both investment options, 0.3 ≤ s ≤0.7.  b Spouse gets paid all returns from High 
return (blue) option in a private account, investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own account.   c Spouse gets 
paid all returns from High return (blue) option in cash, investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own account.  d 
Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in a Joint account with investor, investor receives all returns from Low 
return (red) option in own account
(Income Maximizers in Fixed Share Treatment Only)
Wives
(Income Maximizers in Fixed Share Treatment only)
TABLE 6B: Fraction of Income Maximizing Investors, by ʹControl of Incomeʹ Treatments 
TABLE 6A: Mean Investment in High return(Blue) Option ‐‐ Rupees (Min=Rs.0, Max.=Rs.50)
Husbands Wives
N=80 N=31 N=32 N=25 N=23 N=7 N=11 N=5
CONTROL Treatments (Within Participants)
Baseline ‐ Fixed Share Treatmenta 25.63 26.25 23.48 29 24.57 25 26.82 19
Low Control Treatmentb 32.5 32.5 33.48 30.33 32.17 45 23.64 33
Medium Control Treatmentc 30.94 33.13 30.75 26.67 37.17 45.71 32.72 36
High Control Treatmentd 37.25 41.25 35.3 33 38.7 47.86 35 34
Overall Mean Investment ‐ Rs.(3 decisions) 31.58 33.283 30.753 29.75 33.153 40.893 29.545 30.5
ALL None Full Part ALL None Full Part
CONTROL Treatments (Within Participants) Husbands
Baseline ‐ Fixed Share Treatmenta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Low Control Treatmentb 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.35 0.71 0.09 0.40
Medium Control Treatmentc 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.00 0.43 0.71 0.27 0.40
High Control Treatmentd 0.40 0.47 0.45 0.13 0.61 0.86 0.45 0.60
Wives
a Spouse gets paid a fixed share s of returns from both investment options, 0.3 ≤ s ≤0.7.  b Spouse gets paid all returns from High 
return (blue) option in a private account, investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own account.   c Spouse gets 
paid all returns from High return (blue) option in cash, investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own account.  d 
Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in a Joint account with investor, investor receives all returns from Low 
return (red) option in own account.
TABLE 6C: Mean Investment in High return(Blue) Option ‐‐ Rupees (Min=Rs.0, Max.=Rs.50)
(Income Non‐Maximizers in Fixed Share Treatment only)
TABLE 6D: Fraction of Income Maximizing Investors, by ʹControl of Incomeʹ Treatments 
(Income Non‐Maximizers in Fixed Share Treatment Only)
TABLE 7: NEGOTIATION WITH SPOUSE
Men Women
Number of Investors Number of Investors
Total Negotiation Total Negotiation
No Yes No Yes
48 48 0 50 19 31
Before 
Negʹn
After 
Negʹn
Before 
Negʹn
After 
Negʹn
Invt. in Option Blue
(a) =Rs.50 (all decisions) 18 n.a. n.a. 12 21 22
(b) <Rs. 50 (in at least 1 decision) 30 n.a. n.a. 7 10 9
          Mean Invt. in Blue (Rs.):
            ‐‐ Fixed Share Treatment 39.5 n.a. n.a. 42.9 39.5 39.5
            ‐‐ Low Control Treatment 22.5 n.a. n.a. 21.4 31.5 36.5
            ‐‐ Medium Control Treatment 22.5 n.a. n.a. 21.4 23 23
            ‐‐ High Control Treatment 38.4 n.a. n.a. 35.7 42 37
Notes:
 In Low, Medium and High Control treatments, spouses were paid in Private accounts, Cash and in a Joint account with the 
investing spouse respectively.  The Negotiation option allowed the investing spouse in each household in the ʹPartial Informationʹ 
Treatment to discuss and change his/her initial set of investment decisions
       Dependent Variable: Investment in High Return Option 
Indepenent Variables All  No Info Full InfoPartial All  No Info Full InfoPartial
Investor CONTROL‐‐ (Spouse paid in):
Low Control Treatmentb ‐7.289*** ‐7.822*** ‐5.950** ‐8.958*** ‐9.402***‐12.079***‐9.100*** ‐4.6
(1.375) 2.156 2.289 2.933 1.344 2.344 1.937 2.894
Medium Control Treatmentc ‐6.606*** ‐6.485*** ‐4.800** ‐10.625*** ‐6.932*** ‐8.267*** ‐5.900*** ‐6.300*
1.31 2.036 2.154 2.88 1.251 2.128 1.711 3.186
High Control Treatmentd ‐0.843 ‐1.337 0.65 ‐2.917 ‐2.530*** ‐2.178 ‐3.900** ‐0.5
1.221 2.067 1.984 2.188 0.948 1.51 1.511 2.15
No Information to spousee 0.176 ‐0.846
1.473 1.398
Partial Information to spouse ‐0.411 0.794
1.983 1.744
Constant 42.50*** 42.47*** 41.33*** 43.43*** 47.64*** 48.26*** 47.47*** 46.90***
Number of Observations 1000 404 404 192 1000 404 404 200
R2 0.0375 0.0400 0.0269 0.0647 0.0522 0.0825 0.0422 0.0296
All regressions reported here include individual fixed effects.
 * Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level and  Standard errors in parantheses.
TABLE 8: IMPACT OF CONTROL ON INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY
MEN  WOMEN
e The omitted information category is ʹFull informationʹ where the investorʹs spouse is informed about his/her investment options, actual 
choices and earnings.  Under ʹpartial informationʹ the spouse is only informed of what the investor earned for him/her ‐‐ but not about the 
investorʹs options or actual choices.  
Footnotes: The omitted control treatment here is the Fixed Share case where each spouse gets paid a fixed share s of returns from both 
investment options.  b Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in a private account, investor receives all returns from Low 
return (red) option in own account.  c Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in cash, investor receives all returns from 
Low return (red) option in own account. d Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in a Joint account with investor, 
investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own account.  
Information Treatments Information Treatments
 
 
TABLE 9: IMPACT OF INFORMATION ON INVESTMENT IN HIGH RETURN (BLUE) OPTION
MEN WOMEN
Control Treatments Control Treatments
All 
Treat-
ments
Fixed 
share-
baseline
Low 
Controlb
Medium
Controlc
High 
Controld
All 
Treat-
ments
Fixed 
share-
baseline
Low 
Controlb
Medium
Controlc
 
 
High 
Controld
Information Treatmentsa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable: Invt. in High Return (blue) Option
No Information 0.223 1.546 0.187 ‐0.194 ‐0.38 ‐0.593 0.233 ‐2.578 ‐2.188 2.101
[1.194] [1.883] [2.535] [2.654] [2.239] ‐1.166 [1.025] [2.948] [2.603] [2.021]
Partial Information ‐0.248 2.562 ‐0.369 ‐3.18 0.052 0.836 ‐1.083 3.611 ‐1.629 2.458
[1.521] [2.166] [3.234] [3.505] [2.777] ‐1.389 [1.655] [3.250] [3.293] [2.438]
Share of Earnings 0.260*** 0.069
(Fixed Share) [0.092] [0.061]
Other Controls:
Husband's age ‐0.157 ‐0.181 0.311 ‐0.107 ‐0.691** 0.078 ‐0.065 0.197 0.082 0.098
[0.155] [0.201] [0.347] [0.333] [0.318] ‐0.132 [0.126] [0.320] [0.314] [0.223]
Wife's age ‐0.015 0.137 ‐0.664* ‐0.012 0.522 ‐0.074 0.073 ‐0.228 ‐0.02 ‐0.122
[0.178] [0.251] [0.402] [0.376] [0.364] ‐0.145 [0.144] [0.361] [0.339] [0.239]
Constant 45.703*** 31.005*** 45.256*** 41.267*** 50.227*** 42.547*** 44.671*** 38.530*** 39.330*** 44.184***
[2.147] [6.378] [4.338] [4.828] [5.952] ‐1.946 [3.217] [4.925] [4.585] [3.135]
No. of Obs. 996 249 249 249 249 1004 251 251 251 251
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.05 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.01
Notes: a The omitted information category is ʹFull informationʹ where the investorʹs spouse is informed about his/her investment options, actual choices and earnings.  
Under ʹpartial informationʹ the spouse is only informed of what the investor earned for him/her ‐‐ but not about the investorʹs options or actual choices.  
 In the Fixed Share case treatment each spouse gets paid a fixed share s (between 30% and 70% of returns) from both  investment options .  b Spouse gets paid all returns 
from High return (blue) option in a private account, investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own account.  c Spouse gets paid all returns from High 
return (blue) option in cash, investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own account. d Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in a 
Joint account with investor, investor receives all returns from Low return (red) option in own account.  Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Indepenent Variables All All  No Info Full Info Partial All All  No Info Full Info Partial
CONTROL
Low Controlb ‐7.260*** ‐7.260*** ‐7.822*** ‐5.891** ‐8.958*** ‐9.365*** ‐10.545*** ‐12.079*** ‐9.010*** n.a.f
[1.366] [1.366] [2.143] [2.252] [2.894] [1.335] [1.503] [2.329] [1.908]
Medium Controlc ‐6.580*** ‐6.580*** ‐6.485*** ‐4.752** ‐10.625*** ‐6.706*** ‐6.807*** ‐8.267*** ‐5.347*** n.a.
[1.301] [1.301] [2.023] [2.119] [2.841] [1.262] [1.378] [2.115] [1.772]
High Controld ‐0.84 ‐0.84 ‐1.337 0.644 ‐2.917 ‐2.321** ‐2.772** ‐2.178 ‐3.366** n.a.
[1.212] [1.213] [2.054] [1.952] [2.159] [0.965] [1.086] [1.501] [1.580]
Information Treatments:
No Information to spousee ‐0.272 ‐0.374 ‐0.408 ‐0.463 n.a.
[1.471] [1.318] [1.384] [1.339]
Partial Information to spouse ‐1.024 ‐1.17 1.005 0 n.a.
[2.017] [1.775] [1.712] [0.000]
ʺRational Husbandʺ 10.233*** 7.733*** 12.000*** 11.727*** 5.554*** 7.347*** 3.791* n.a.
[1.246] [1.725] [2.077] [3.106] [1.553] [2.346] [2.036]
Constant 42.507*** 35.617*** 37.192*** 33.258*** 35.375*** 47.643*** 44.336*** 43.248*** 44.923*** n.a.
[1.250] [1.441] [1.666] [1.976] [2.762] [0.970] [1.335] [1.749] [1.651]
Observations 1000 1000 404 404 192 1008 808 404 404 n.a.
R‐squared 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.05 n.a.
Investor CONTROL
Low Controlb ‐7.260*** ‐6.856*** ‐7.822*** ‐5.891** n.a.f ‐9.365*** ‐9.365*** ‐12.079*** ‐9.010*** ‐4.6
[1.366] [1.549] [2.143] [2.252] [1.335] [1.336] [2.329] [1.908] [2.857]
Medium Controlc ‐6.580*** ‐5.619*** ‐6.485*** ‐4.752** n.a. ‐6.706*** ‐6.706*** ‐8.267*** ‐5.347*** ‐6.300*
[1.301] [1.460] [2.023] [2.119] [1.262] [1.263] [2.115] [1.772] [3.145]
High Controld ‐0.84 ‐0.347 ‐1.337 0.644 n.a. ‐2.321** ‐2.321** ‐2.178 ‐3.366** ‐0.5
[1.212] [1.412] [2.054] [1.952] [0.965] [0.965] [1.501] [1.580] [2.122]
No Information to spousee ‐0.272 ‐0.241 n.a. ‐0.408 ‐0.845
[1.471] [1.470] [1.384] [1.331]
Partial Information to spouse ‐1.024 0 n.a. 1.005 0.907
[2.017] [0.000] [1.712] [1.533]
ʺRationalʺ Wife ‐0.787 ‐1.159 ‐0.54 n.a. 11.034*** 1.873 15.277*** 15.056**
[2.293] [2.302] [3.513] [2.242] [2.727] [2.354] [6.028]
Constant 42.507*** 42.744*** 43.554*** 41.818*** n.a. 47.643*** 37.810*** 46.524*** 33.863*** 33.350***
[1.250] [2.455] [2.373] [3.504] [0.970] [2.149] [2.869] [2.203] [5.396]
Number of Observations 1000 808 404 404 n.a. 1008 1008 404 404 200
R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 n.a. 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.11
e The omitted information category is ʹFull informationʹ where the investorʹs spouse is informed about his/her investment options, actual choices and 
earnings.  Under ʹpartial informationʹ the spouse is only informed of what the investor earned for him/her ‐‐ but not about the investorʹs options or actual 
choices.  Columns with the heading ʹAllʹ regressions reported above include individual fixed effects.   f Only one spouse invests in this information 
treatment.  * Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level and  Standard errors in parantheses.
MEN WOMEN
TABLE 10A: ʺRATIONALʺ HUSBANDʹS INVESTMENT PATTERNS & INFLUENCE ON WIFEʹS
TABLE 10B: ʺRATIONALʺ WIFEʹS INVESTMENT PATTERNS & INFLUENCE ON HUSBANDʹS
Dependent Variable: Investment in High Return (Blue) Option
Notes: a ʺRationalʺ Husband(Wife) is a husband(wife) who invests the entire Rs.50 in the high return (blue)option when he/she receives a fixed share of 
household earnings from both investment options.  The omitted control treatment here is the Fixed Share case where each spouse gets paid a fixed share s 
of returns from both investment options.  b Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in a private account, investor receives all returns 
from Low return (red) option in own account.  c Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in cash, investor receives all returns from 
Low return (red) option in own account. d Spouse gets paid all returns from High return (blue) option in a Joint account with investor, investor receives 
all returns from Low return (red) option in own account.  
Independent Variables:
All 
Control 
Low 
Controlc
Medium 
Controlc
High 
Controlc
All Control 
Treatments
Low 
Controlc
Medium 
Controlc
High 
Controlc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ʺRationalʺ Husbanda 5.057*** 3.03 6.648*** 5.472** 6.946*** 9.906*** 4.515 6.417**
[1.582] [2.153] [2.376] [2.130] ‐2.054 [3.171] [2.957] [2.519]
No Informationb ‐0.252 0.121 ‐0.339 ‐0.533 ‐0.974 ‐2.802 ‐2.176 2.055
[1.662] [2.539] [2.627] [2.201] ‐1.751 [2.903] [2.609] [2.007]
Partial Information ‐1.337 ‐0.47 ‐3.402 ‐0.138 0 0 0 0
[2.289] [3.221] [3.437] [2.676] 0 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Husbandʹs age ‐0.139 0.324 ‐0.079 ‐0.663** 0.145 0.196 0.108 0.13
[0.259] [0.351] [0.344] [0.325] ‐0.221 [0.323] [0.324] [0.230]
Wifeʹs age ‐0.055 ‐0.665 ‐0.014 0.515 ‐0.144 ‐0.186 ‐0.076 ‐0.17
[0.302] [0.407] [0.388] [0.371] ‐0.252 [0.376] [0.352] [0.248]
ʺRationalʺ Wife
42.125*** 42.736*** 35.739*** 48.231*** 35.960*** 30.502*** 37.174*** 40.205***
[3.466] [4.805] [5.345] [5.817] ‐3.838 [5.832] [6.035] [4.483]
Observations 747 249 249 249 603 201 201 201
R‐squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05
ʺRationalʺ Wifea ‐2.452 ‐1.198 ‐5.516 ‐0.76 6.154* 5.686 5.016 7.760**
[2.763] [3.533] [3.579] [3.273] ‐3.143 [3.794] [3.512] [3.609]
No Informationb ‐0.033 0.198 0.056 ‐0.394 ‐1.089 ‐2.763 ‐2.352 1.848
[1.675] [2.546] [2.652] [2.233] ‐1.788 [2.958] [2.600] [2.014]
Partial Information 0 0 0 0 1.465 3.597 ‐1.642 2.439
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] ‐2.128 [3.216] [3.276] [2.360]
Husbandʹs age ‐0.129 0.47 ‐0.112 ‐0.744** 0.133 0.204 0.088 0.107
[0.291] [0.395] [0.371] [0.369] ‐0.219 [0.319] [0.310] [0.210]
Wifeʹs age ‐0.098 ‐0.807* ‐0.042 0.553 ‐0.125 ‐0.229 ‐0.022 ‐0.124
[0.338] [0.454] [0.416] [0.420] ‐0.243 [0.360] [0.335] [0.225]
Constant 48.785*** 44.672*** 47.485*** 51.806*** 34.912*** 33.199*** 34.627*** 36.909***
[4.203] [5.498] [6.224] [7.080] ‐4.522 [6.222] [5.805] [4.876]
Observations 603 201 201 201 753 251 251 251
R‐squared 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
TABLE 11A: IMPACT OF RATIONAL HUSBANDS ON INVESTMENT DECISIONS
a ʺRationalʺ Husband(Wife) is a husband(wife) who invests the entire Rs.50 in the high return (blue)option when he/she receives a fixed share 
of household earnings from both investment options. b The omitted information category here is ʹFull Informationʹ where spouses receive 
information about investorʹs options, actual choices and earnings.  Under ʹNo informationʹ they do not receive information about any of these 
and under ʹPartial Informationʹ they are told about the amount the investor earned for them, but not his/her investment options or actual 
choices.  cLow, Medium and High (investor) Control treatments had returns from the high return option paid to spouse in a private a/c, in 
cash and in a joint a/c with the investor respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: Investment in High Return option (Rs.) (Min.=Rs.0; Max.=Rs.50)
MEN WOMEN
TABLE 11B: IMPACT OF RATIONAL WIVES ON INVESTMENT DECISIONS
